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As Unoriginal as They Wanna Be:
Upholding Musical Parody in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
How come you're always such a fussy young man?
Don't want no captain crunch
Don't want no raisin bran
Well don't you know that other kids are
Starving in Japan
So eat it, just eat it'
Singer-songwriter "Weird Al" Yankovic shot to fame in the 1980s and
1990s with his inspired parodies of Top 40 pop songs.2 Weird Al's re-
worked versions were irreverent, clever, and catchy? Those little ditties
sold millions of records, prompting one commentator to dub Weird Al a
"startling commercial success."4 Always ready to cash in on a hot trend,
the American music industry followed Weird Al's lead and "reawaken[ed]
to the reality of just how lucrative music parody can be."5
1. MICHAEL JACKSON & AL YANKOViC, Eat It, on THE FOOD ALBuM (Rock 'n' Roll
Records/Scotti Bros. Records 1993).
2. Charles J. Sanders & Steven R. Gordon, Stranger in Parodies: Weird Al and
the Law of Musical Satire, 1 FoRDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL PROP. L.F. 11, 11
(1990). Yankovic gained notoriety parodying such songs as Michael Jackson's "Beat It"
with "Eat It" and Madonna's "Like A Virgin" with the blatantly unerotic "Like A Sur-
geon." See MICHAEL JACKSON & AL YANKoVIC, Eat It, on THE FOOD ALBUM (Rock 'n'
Roll Records/Scotti Bros. Records 1993); AL YANKOviC, Like A Surgeon, on DARE TO
BE STUPID (Scotti Bros. Tapes, Compact Discs & Records 1990).
3. Yankovic's parody of The Knack's "My Sharona" is an ode to lunch meaL
"Oooh, my little hungry one, hungry one/Open up a package of my bologna/Oooh, I
think the toast is done, the toast is done/Top it with a little of my bologna." D.
FIEGER, B. AVERRE, A. YANKOVIC, My Bologna, on THE FOOD ALBuM (Rock 'n' Roll
Records/Scotti Bros. Records 1993). Other Yankovic titles include "Living With A Her-
nia" ("Living in America") and "I Lost On Jeopardy" ("Our Love's In Jeopardy"). See
Sanders & Gordon, supra note 2, at 11.
4. Sanders & Gordon, supra note 2, at 11. Yankovic has sold more than three
million copies of his records. Id.
5. Id.
Who should profit from these chart-topping charlatans? The original
artist who copyrighted the song, or the parodist? With the heightened
popularity of musical parody, the issue arises whether highly marketable
song parodies are "fair uses" of copyrighted material and thus exempt
from the infringement provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976.6
Musical parody7 is certainly not new. For centuries, people have used
this form of satire as art, criticism, and humor.' More than thirty years
ago, one circuit judge noted that "parody and satire are deserving of
substantial freedom-both as entertainment and a form of social and
literary criticism."9
To this day, parody enjoys special protection. The current Copyright
Act of 1976 allows parody to sidestep infringement liability if the parody
is deemed a fair use of copyrighted material."0 The Act's doctrine of fair
use has been described as "one of the most important and well-estab-
lished limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners.""
Despite parody's existence through the ages and this country's devel-
opment of the doctrine of fair use for well over a century, by late 1993
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides that a work made for the purposes of criticism or
comment constitutes a "fair use" and "is not an infringement of copyright" 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1989 & Supp. 1993) The Copyright Act states:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work,
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
7. Parody has been defined as a "literary or artistic work that imitates the char-
acteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule, often with certain
peculiarities greatly heightened or exaggerated." 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
247 (2d ed. 1989). Musical parody is "an imitation of a musical composition in which
the original text or music has been altered usu[ally] in a comical manner." WEBSTER'S
THIm NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1643 (1986).
8. Sanders & Gordon, supra note 2, at 11; see also Julie Bisceglia, Parody and
Copyright Protectio: Turning the Balancing Act into a Juggling Act, 34 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 1 (1987) (crediting the ancient Greeks with the creation of paro-
dy).
9. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1989 & Supp. 1993); supra note 6.
11. CRAIG JOYCE FT AL, COPYRIGHT LAW 779 (3d ed. 1994); see also Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (discussing what would ultimately be
labeled the fair use doctrine)).
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the issue of fair use in the troubled context" of musical parody had yet
to reach the United States Supreme Court. The case of CampbeU v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc." marked the Court's first examination of the fair
use doctrine in the complex area of musical parody.4
The Supreme Court's holding in CampbeU enhances the ability of art-
ists to use copyrighted musical works in such a manner as to avoid pen-
alty for copyright infringement. 5 As a result, the decision increases the
protection of a musical artist's fundamental right to free speech, which
ultimately benefits society through broader exposure to information and
ideas. 6
This Note takes the position that, while critics of the "fair use" doc-
trine abound, the Supreme Court properly upheld the use of the doctrine,
correctly applied the four-factor test embodying "fair use," and clarified
the doctrine as well.
When determining the legitimacy of parodies, courts must take into
account two counterbalancing rationales that underlie two distinct yet
interdependent constitutional provisions' 7-the interest of authors in
commercially exploiting their work under the Copyright Clause" and the
public's interest in the free flow of ideas and the broadest dissemination
of information under the First Amendment.'" With these important con-
12. The doctrine of fair use has developed a reputation as "the most troublesome
in the whole law of copyright." Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d
Cir. 1939). Further, Judge Nelson described parody as "the most troublesome fair use
issue." Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992) (Nel-
son, J., dissenting), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
13. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
14. The Court discussed fair use in the parody context only once previously, but
did not render an opinion because of an equally divided court. Id. at 1171 (citing
Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aWfd sub nom. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys. Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam)).
15. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1167-79 (upholding the fair use doctrine and hold-
ing that a "commercial parody . . . may be a fair use within the meaning of. . . 17
U.S.C. § 107").
16. See id.
17. See Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLum. L REV.
983, 991 (1970) (stating that "reconciliation of copyright with the first amendment re-
quires the strildng of a similar balance between the property interest of the copyright
holder and the public interest" in information and ideas).
18. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times, to Au-
thors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings ... ." Id.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press .... " Id.
siderations in mind, the current fair use doctrine is the appropriate test
to implement because it strikes an optimal balance between these two
opposing factors. To hold otherwise, by favoring a modified version or a
completely new creation, would abrogate the most meaningful, definitive,
and workable standard courts have in adjudicating parody claims. Fur-
ther, a contrary holding would severely diminish the importance of an
individual's fundamental right to free speech, eradicate society's incen-
tive to create "useful arts," and impede the public's access to new ideas
and information.
This Note provides recommendations to further clarify the fair use
doctrine for more consistent application.' This Note suggests that an
additional factor be added to the fair use test. By more effectively
promoting the rationale behind the Copyright Clause, this new factor will
provide equilibrium between the Copyright Clause and the First Amend-
ment.2
Overall, this Note presents an in-depth discussion and analysis of
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,' and examines its result and rami-
fications. Part II discusses the historical background of copyright, par-
ody, and the fair use doctrine.' Part III explains the facts of Campbell
and the issues that arise within the scope of this case.24 Part IV analyzes
the Supreme Court's unanimous decision.25 Part V discusses the impact
of the decision and recommends an additional provision for increased
adherence to the constitutional goals underlying the fair use doctrine.26
Finally, Part VI provides a brief conclusion. 7
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Foundation and Statutory Codification of
Copyright Law
The Constitution preserves the right of authors, inventors, and artists
to exploit their own works.' The framers gave Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
20. See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
22. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
23. See irfra notes 28-117 and accompanying text.
24. See ifra notes 118-28 and accompanying text
25. See iftra notes 129-251 and accompanying text.
26. See irfra notes 252-73 and accompanying text
27. See infra notes 275-81 and accompanying text
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Times, to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. "'
Although the precise purpose behind that clause is unclear, the con-
stitutional language, which does not employ the term "copyright," sug-
gests that the framers' aim was to encourage the creation and dissemi-
nation of knowledge "so as to increase social welfare."' This aim is to
be achieved by means of an economic incentive, by granting authors the
exclusive and therefore monopolistic right to exploit their work for a
limited time."
Pursuant to this constitutional delegation, Congress passed the first
federal copyright act in 1790, thereby protecting authors"n rights in their
artistic creations.' Federal copyright law has been revised several times
since 1791; the most recent revision was the Copyright Act of 1976,
which took effect on January 1, 1978.3 The 1976 Act has itself been
amended several times in response to our society's rapidly changing,
technology.'
Among the exclusive rights granted to a copyright owner in the Copy-
right Act of 1976 are the rights to reproduce a work, to prepare deriva-
tive works, to distribute copies to the public, and to perform or display a
work publicly.' Penalties for infringement of these rights can be severe:
29. Id.
30. JOYCE ET AL, supra note 11, at 9-10. In fact, since the middle of the nine-
teenth century, the United States Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that "[t]he
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inven-
tors in 'Science and useful Arts.'" Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Similarly,
legislative history strongly advances this same notion. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (stating that a copyright is "[n]ot primarily for the benefit of
the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public").
31. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(A copyright "grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by
the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.").
32. This Note uses the terms "author" and "copyright owner" or "copyright holder"
interchangeably, although the creator of a work may, of course, transfer the copyright
to another. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1988).
33. See JOYCE ET AL, supra note 11, at 10.
34. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1988).
35. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) (dealing with computer programs).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
a court can issue an injunction,37 can impound allegedly infringing
works during a legal action,' and can award substantial damages to the
copyright owner.' The most pervasive type of infringement is the dupli-
cation of an author's work.' While copyright law generally prohibits
duplication, it also provides exceptions where it is more beneficial to
society to allow the copying.
B. The Fair Use Doctrine
Because every idea, to some extent, owes its origins to those ideas
that came before it, granting authors absolute monopolies over their
work may deny a subsequent author the creative opportunity to build
upon it." Such overprotection works counter to the underlying premise
of copyright law by impeding the free flow of ideas and the broadest
dissemination of information for the public good. ' In an effort to miti-
gate the effects of overprotection, copyright law sanctions the fair use
doctrine, permitting courts to excuse copyright infringement in particular
situations.'
The fair use doctrine attempts to harmonize two potentially conflicting
clauses of the Constitution: the First Amendment, which guarantees free-
dom of speech and of the press," and the Copyright Clause, which
grants to authors the "exclusive Right to their Writings."' "[W]hen the
demands of public access to information are at odds with the copyright
holder's claim to exclusivity," the First Amendment is implicated.' The
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1988).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1988).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1988).
40. See JOYCE ET AL, SUpra note 11, at 21 (noting that modem reproductive tech-
nology allows virtually anyone to be a "publisher").
41. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
42. The Supreme Court observed that "[t]here are situations ... in which strict
enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very 'Progress of Science and useful
Arts' that copyright is intended to promote." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (explaining that the author's
interest is subordinate to the advancement of the public welfare).
43. The fair use doctrine developed in common law because there were circum-
stances where the benefit to society in allowing use outweighed the artists' exclusive
rights in their work. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
549 (1985). Fair use is defined as "[a] privilege in others than the owner of a copy-
right to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the owners
consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner." BLACK'S LAW Dic'Io-
NARY 598 (6th ed. 1990).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46. Deborah A. Hartnett, A New Era for Copyright Law: Reconstituting the Fair
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fair use doctrine is the means by which these two concerns are recon-
ciled. 7 Folsom v. Marsh' first intimated the doctrine in 1841 and the
term "fair use" first appeared twenty-eight years later in Lawrence v.
Dana.'
While the fair use doctrine has been applied in common law for over
150 years, it was not codified until the Copyright Act of 1976.' This cod-
ification is essentially a restatement premised on the existing judicial
precedent set out in Marsh." Section 107 of the act enumerates four
factors to be considered when making a fair use determination: (1) the
purpose and character of the infringing use, including whether it is com-
mercial or nonprofit;52 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;' (3) the
amount and substantiality of the elements of the original used;' and (4)
the effect on the value and potential market for the original.' Section
107 further states that the fair use exception may be applied in cases
where the copyrighted material is used for "criticism, comment, news
Use Doctrine, 39 COPYRIGHT L SymP. (ASCAP) 167, 169-70 (1992). Free speech inter-
ests are implicitly involved in every copyright infringement case because overprotec-
tion of a copyright counters the underlying premise of copyright law by impeding the
free flow of ideas and the broadest dissemination of information for the public good.
See supra note 19, -and infrt notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
47. Hartnett, supra note 46, at 167. Because the fair use doctrine already incorpo-
rates First Amendment considerations into its balancing test, courts have consistently
rejected a pure free speech defense in copyright infringement actions. See, e.g., Roy
Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 1977); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v.
Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014
(1978).
48. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). In this case, Justice Story dis-
tilled the methodology of the fair use doctrine: "[L]ook to the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the ob-
jects, of the original work." Id. at 348.
49. 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
51. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169-70 (1994). See gener-
aly Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (introducing the
theory of the fair use doctrine).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), schol-
arship, or research."'
1. Relationship to Parody
Although parody is not specifically designated as one of the favored
uses under § 107, the legislative history of the statute lists parody as one
of the activities that might be accorded fair use status. An effective
parody requires that the audience be able to identify both the subject of
the parody and the parodist's mocking distortions. "To achieve this, a
parodist often must mirror or directly copy portions of the original."68 A
parodist may either appropriate the actual words of a text or lyrics or
may appropriate the structure or general expression of the original.' In
fact, parody's perplexing nature stems from the law's dual demands. On
one hand, the law insists that distinct features of the original be copied
in order to achieve a strong identification with the original work. On the
other hand, the law requires that the copying be tethered so as to not
infringe on the author's copyright. Given this conundrum, the fair use
doctrine has been inconsistently applied in parody cases over the years.
2. Survey of Relevant Cases and the Inconsistent Application of the
Fair Use Doctrine
A multitude of cases have analyzed parody using the fair use doctrine
to determine whether the parody constitutes copyright infringement.' In
applying the fair use analysis, however, courts have been widely incon-
sistent.6 ' The majority of decisions involving fair use in parody focus on
the amount and substantiality of the takdng.' Recently however, the
commercial use evaluation has gained prominence.' Still other decisions
turn narrowly on the content of the parody and the bad faith conduct of
the parodist." A brief survey of various courts' rationales shows the im-
mediate need for clarification of the parameters of the fair use doctrine
in order to produce more consistent application.'
56. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976).
58. Beth Warnken Van Hecke, But Seriously, Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard
of Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L REv. 465, 466 (1992).
59. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAvID NIMMER, NIMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 [C]
(1992).
60. See infra notes 66-117 and accompanying text.
61. See ifra notes 66-117 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
63. See irfra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
64. See irtfra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
65. See iifra notes 66-116 and accompanying text.
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a. The purpose and character of use
In evaluating the first of the fair use factors in the context of music
parody, courts have directed their attention to two distinct views: (1)
whether the work is for a commercial use; or (2) whether the parody
targets the original work as the object of its humor or ridicule, or uses
the original merely as a vehicle for broader comment.' In fair use, but
not in the context of parody, the Supreme Court has explored a third
notion: whether the work demonstrates a broader social value. 7 These
theories have been applied both independently and in conjunction with
one another, some with considerable emphasis and some with cursory
reference.'
i. The commercial use presumption
The first fair use factor directs courts to consider the "purpose and
character of the use" relative to "whether the use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."' The Supreme Court
has indicated that the commercial nature of the use tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use since "every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege
that belongs to the owner of the copyright."70 Following this precedent,
music parody decisions have adopted the presumption with much differ-
entiation. Some have given the presumption significant weight, as did the
court of appeals in Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell,r' while others
have assigned it little value.
In New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc.,' the
copyright owner of the movie "A Nightmare on Elm Street" brought an
infringement action against the creators of a music video entitled "A
Nightmare on My Street."73 The court's evaluation of the purpose and
66. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984);
infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 69-91 and accompanying text.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
70. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. In this case, Universal, owner of copyrights on some of
the television programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves, claimed infringe-
ment of their copyrights when the public recorded these programs at home on video
tape recorders manufactured by Sony. Id. at 420-21.
71. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
72. 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
73. Id. at 1520. Both the movie and the video featured a character named
character of the use focused primarily on the commercial motivation
behind the making of the video.74 The court held that because the mak-
ing of the video was strictly economically motivated, the parody repre-
sented an overt commercial purpose, which weighed heavily against a
finding of fair use.75
The court in Fisher v. Dees,'6 however, demonstrated greater flexibili-
ty in its application of the commercial use presumption to a musical
parody.77 In this case, Rick Dees parodied Johnny Mathis' song "When
Sunny Gets Blue" with Dees' version entitled "When Sonny Sniffs
Glue."78 The court recognized that a significant purpose of some paro-
dies may be social commentary." In such cases, capitalizing on the orig-
inal and benefiting financially from its use is not the sole purpose of the
parody.' In such an instance, the commercial use presumption is merely
rebuttable because the parody does not unfairly diminish the economic
value of the underlying work, which is the concern of the fourth fac-
tor.
81
ii. The essence of the parody
Another component courts consider in determining fair use under the
first factor examines whether a parody must target the original work as
the object of comment or criticism, or whether the original work can be
used merely as a vehicle to contribute to a heightened social awareness.
The two leading cases have disagreed sharply in this determination.
In Fisher v. Dees,' the court required that the parody target the origi-
nal in order for it to be a fair use.83 The court reasoned that unless the
copied work is the target of the parody to some extent, no justification
"Freddy" who had a burnt face, a low, raspy voice, and gloved hand with sharp im-
plements protruding from his fingers, and contained similar dream imagery. Id. at
1522.
74. Id. at 1526.
75. Id.
76. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 437-38.
78. Id. at 434. The parody mimics the first six of the song's thirty-eight bars of
music, which is the "heart" of the song. Id. Moreover, the parody alters the original's
opening lyrics: "When Sunny gets blue, her eyes' get gray and cloudy, then the rain
begins to fall" is changed to "When Sonny sniffs glue, her eyes get red and bulgy,
then her hair begins to fall." Id.
79. Id. at 437.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
83. Id. at 436.
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exists for borrowing from the original.' In contrast, the court in
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.' held that the pivotal
question in determining whether the parody is a fair use is not whether it
is a parody of the copied work, but whether it is a parody at all.' The
court concluded that even if the "Saturday Night Live" skit song "I Love
Sodom" did not directly parody the plaintiffs "I Love New York" tourism
campaign jingle, this would not preclude a finding of fair use.'
iii. The social value of the parody
In deciphering the first factor of the fair use doctrine, the Supreme
Court drew a distinction in both Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.'M and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
terprises.' The Court's distinction focused on whether the appropriated
material was employed for "productive" or "unproductive" uses. The
Court stated that a "productive" use incorporates the original material in
order to create a new and socially useful work for purposes such as
comment, teaching, or scholarship.' In both cases, the Court essentially
concluded that the productiveness of a work is simply one consideration
in a fair use analysis."
b. The nature of the copyrighted work
Courts have permitted a finding of fair use more frequently in cases
involving factual or informational works than in cases involving creative
works or works of entertainment.' The Supreme Court observed that a
84. Id.
85. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
86. Id. at 746.
87. Id. The court indicated that the parody was "an attempt... to satirize the
way in which New York City has attempted to improve its somewhat tarnished image
through the use of a slick advertising campaign... [and] it had nothing to do
with ... the song itself." Id. at 745.
88. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
89. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). In this case, Nation Enterprises copied verbatim former
President Ford's unpublished memoirs shortly before Time magazine, which had a
contract to publish the memoirs. Id.
90. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (1984).
91. Id.; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
92. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 417, 455 n.40
(1984); see also Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
parody is more likely to be a fair use when it constitutes a factual work
because "the law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate fac-
tual works than works of fiction or fantasy. " ' This observation may ex-
plain why few cases invoke the second factor. Most parodies target cre-
ative, not factual, works."
c. Amount and substantiality of the taking
Many courts have relied on this third factor, amount and substantiality
of taking, to determine whether a parody constitutes a fair use. There is
general agreement that a nearly verbatim copying of an original work is a
taking that exceeds the permissible scope of fair use.' However, paro-
dy, by its very nature, demands at least some copying. Therefore, courts
have devised the "conjure up" test, where using only as much of the
original as is necessary to conjure up or to evoke recognition of the
original is considered fair use.' Nevertheless, the line between using
merely enough to conjure up the original and substantial copying is
blurred."
d. Market effect
Under the fourth factor, market effect, courts consider the effect of
the alleged infringing use upon the market for the original.' Courts have
established market harm to the original by either. (1) a presumption of
93. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1985).
94. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545. A parody of a legal textbook would be an unusual
attempt at humor. Id.
95. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981); Warner Bros., Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204, 207-09 (2d Cir. 1981); Walt Disney Prods. v.
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v.
Walt Disney Prods. 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
96. See Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348,
354 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (introducing the "conjure up" test).
97. The quantitative evaluation requires the actual amount copied to be measured.
However, there is no precise definition for the "right" amount. See Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 569 (finding that the defendant's taking of approximately 300 words of
President Ford's 200,000 word manuscript was not a fair use). But see Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984) (finding that verbatim
video tape copying was a fair use).
The qualitative evaluation requires an inquiry into the extent that one copies the
meaning and substance of the original. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding a fair use where defen-
dant did not copy the essence or content of plaintiffs magazine, even though defen-
dant copied the entire cover).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
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harm when the parody's use is commercial;' or (2) proof that the paro-
dy has the "effect of fulfilling the demand for the original. " "
In Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,'"' the court evaluated a
commercial for Miller Beer in which comedian Joe Piscopo imitated a
rap group called The Fat Boys."n The court found that the appropria-
tion of material "to promote the sale of commercial products" automati-
cally constitutes an unfair use." The court relied in part on Sony,
which presumed market harm when the intended use of the parody is
commercial gain.'"
In contrast, the court in Fisher v. Dees"° argued that the market
harm to the original is not derived from the parody's "potential to de-
stroy or diminish the market for the original-any bad review can have
that effect."'" Rather, the court asserted that attention should be direct-
ed to whether the parody "fulfills the demand for the original;" that is,
whether consumers will be equally satisfied purchasing the parody over
the original work."° If not, both works may co-exist without market
harm to the original."
e. Alternative factors in the parody algorithm
Courts have also implemented factors outside the prescribed fair use
statute.
i. Bad faith
The Supreme Court has indicated that bad faith conduct by a defen-
dant has severe implications in a fair use determination.'" For instance,
99. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
100. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964).
101. 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
102. Id. at 827-28.
103. Id. at 829-31 (quoting Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720
F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983)).
104. Id. at 832; see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
451 (1984).
105. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
106. Id. at 438.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Because "fair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing,'" courts have wo-
ven "the propriety of the defendant's conduct" into the fair use equation. See, e.g.,
in Harper & Row, the Court found that the defendant pilfered a forth-
coming publication, and that such conduct was in bad faith."' This con-
duct weighed against a finding of fair use."' In Fisher, the court ana-
lyzed the defendant's conduct in creating a parody of plaintiff's song
after plaintiff had refused to grant him permission."2 The court found
that such conduct was not in bad faith since the defendant had asked for
permission, and that "[p]arodists will seldom get permission from those
whose works are parodied.""'3
ii. Moral implications
On occasion, courts have equated a parody's morally reprehensible
content with a direct finding of unfair use. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,"4
the court reasoned that an off-color music parody was an unfair use be-
cause it harmed the market for the original."' However, the MCA deci-
sion centered on the court's disapproval of the parody's content, which it
found to be nothing more than a blatant substitution of "dirty lyrics. ""'
f. Summation of case law
It should be obvious from the preceding survey of divergent court
holdings that current fair use parody analysis requires some fine-tun-
ing-one can scarcely imagine greater havoc among the lower courts.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (quoting 3
NIMMER, supra note 59, at § 13.05 [A].
110. Id.
111. Id. at 563.
112. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437.
113. Id.
114. 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 184-85. In this case, copyright owner MCA sued the defendant for paro-
dying the Andrews Sisters' 1940 classic "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" with an allitera-
tive "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C." Id. at 182.
116. Id. at 185; see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979)
(stating that parodying the cartoon characters' "wholesomeness" and "innocence"
could not be justified as fair use). In this case, Air Pirates was an adult underground
comic book
"which had placed several well-known Disney cartoon characters in incongru-
ous settings where they engaged in activities clearly antithetical to the ac-
cepted Mickey Mouse world of scrubbed faces, bright smiles and happy end-
ings." It centered around a "rather bawdy depiction of the Disney characters
as active members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting countercul-
ture."
Id. at 753 (quoting Kevin W. Wheelwright, Comment, Parody, Copyrights and the First
Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L REV. 564, 571, 582 (1976)).
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The flexible and fact-sensitive approach envisioned by Congress has
produced widely varying and conflicting notions of fair use. There is
inadequate treatment of, or overemphasis on, some factors, and inap-
propriate utilization of other factors outside of the statutory framework.
This not only illustrates the multifarious nature of the fair use analysis,
but also underscores the immediate need for the amelioration of the fair
use doctrine in order to achieve a consistent and predictable standard by
which to review parodies. Fine-tuning of fair use also is needed to ensure
that the interests of both the parodist and the author are adequately
balanced. However, a complete overhaul of the system is not justified.
There is an abundance of analysis of fair use in case law; the Supreme
Court must simply set forth a concise and logical clarification of the
proper factors to be used and the manner in which they should be imple-
mented. The case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. "7 provided the
Supreme Court with a prime opportunity to reorient judicial thinking and
realign the fair use analysis with the doctrine's long-standing and explicit
fundamental premises.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees"8 wrote the ballad "Oh, Pretty
Woman" and assigned their rights in the song to Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
which then registered the song for copyright protection."9
Luther R. Campbell, in conjunction with Christopher Wongwon, Mark
Ross, and David Hobbs, constitute the popular rap music group known
as 2 Live Crew. In 1989, Campbell wrote a song entitled "Pretty Woman,"
which he intended as a satire of Orbison's song.'21 On July 5, 1989, 2
Live Crew's manager requested permission from Acuff-Rose to make use
of Orbison's song, indicating that they were willing to pay a fee for such
use, in addition to affording the proper credit for ownership and author-
ship to Acuff-Rose and Orbison. Acuff-Rose denied 2 Live Crew's re-
quest. 121
117. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
118. In this Note, Roy Orbison and William Dees are referred to simply as
"Orbison."
119. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. CL 1164, 1168 (1994); see infra
Appendix A for the words to the song.
120. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168.
121. Id. 2 Live Crew's manager enclosed a copy of the lyrics to their song along
with their request Id.; see infrra Appendix B for the lyrics to 2 Live Crew's "Pretty
Woman."
Nevertheless, after permission was denied, 2 Live Crew released
"Pretty Woman" on record, cassette and compact disc as part of their
album entitled "As Clean As They Wanna Be."'22 Acuff-Rose subsequent-
ly brought suit against 2 Live Crew and its record company, Luke
Skywalker Records, for copyright infringement."u
After weighing the fair use factors, the district court granted summary
judgment for 2 Live Crew, indicating that its song "made fair use of
Orbison's original."24 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court, concluding that the song's "blatantly commercial pur-
pose... prevents this parody from being a fair use." " The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to ascertain whether the commercial purpose
behind 2 Live Crew's song rendered it an unfair use.2 ' The Court held
unanimously that the commercial character of a song parody does not
automatically create a presumption against a finding of fair use.'27 Ac-
cordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion."
122. Campbel, 114 S. Ct. at 1168. The albums identified both Orbison and Dees as
the authors and Acuff-Rose as the publisher of "Pretty Woman." Id.
123. Id. Nearly a quarter of a million copies of the recordings had already been
sold. Id. A copyright infringer is someone who "violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988). The owner of a copyright holds
the following exclusive rights: "(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3)
to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). A derivative work is
"[one] based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical ar-
rangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
2 Live Crew's "Pretty Woman" constitutes either a reproduction under § 106(1)
or derivative work under § 106(2), and would therefore be a copyright infringement,
but for a finding of fair use through the parody exception. Because the work "re-
cast[s]" Roy Orbison's original song, it is most likely a derivative work, the exclusive
right of which is vested in the copyright owner, Acuff-Rose.
124. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168. The district court reasoned that the commercial
use of 2 Live Crew's song did not preclude a fair use; that 2 Live Crew's version
was a parody, replacing the normal lyrics with "shocking ones;" that 2 Live Crew
implanted no more than was necessary to "conjure up the original in order to parody
it;" and that 2 Live Crew's ditty could not remotely affect the market for the original.
Id.
125. Id. at 1169; see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
451 (1984) (holding that there is a presumption of unfair use when it is commercial).
126. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1169. The case was argued on November 9, 1993, and
decided on March 7, 1994. Id. at 1164.
127. Id. at 1179.
128. Id.




The unanimous opinion examined a multitude of issues in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.l" Despite the presence of all four factors of the
fair use analysis, the Court focused on the first factor-the purpose and
character of the use-scrutinizing its commercial aspect in particular."3
Although the Court did not explain the basis for its grant of certiorari,
it can be inferred that the Court wished to clarify its previous statement
in Sony regarding the presumption that the use is unfair when it is for a
"commercial purpose."'3 ' The Court began by stating that but for a find-
ing of fair use through parody, 2 Live Crew's song would undoubtedly be
an infringement of Acuff-Rose's rights in "Oh, Pretty Woman" under the
Copyright Act of 1976." The Court then discussed the underlying histo-
ry and rationale of fair use." The Court recognized that "some opportu-
nity for fair use" is "necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, 'to pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'"'"
The Court then examined the development of the fair use doctrine and
the justifications for such a privilege."n Next, the Court declared that
the fair use doctrine has been accepted and utilized in the United States
for well over a century," beginning with Folsom v. Marsh.'37 The
main justification for the doctrine was to prevent the suffocation of art."
129. 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1179 (1994). Justice Souter authored the unanimous opinion,
and Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1167.
130. Id. at 1171.
131. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984);
see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
132. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1169.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
135. Campbell, 114 S. Ct at 1169-71.
136. Id. at 1169-70.
137. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); see supra note 48.
138. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1169. In support of its position, the Court introduced
some pertinent historical quotes. Id. For instance, the Court presented Lord
Ellenborough's warning that overprotection of copyrights would shackle the arts and
sciences. Id. (quoting Carey v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681, 4 Esp. 168, 170,
(1803)). The Court added Justice Story's famous quote:
[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if
any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original through-
out Every book in literature, science, and art, borrows, and must necessarily
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.
Thereafter, the Court approached the current codification of the
common-law fair use doctrine under § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act."
Before its application of the four-factor test, the Court set the requisite
parameters for the application of § 107. First, the Court explained that
Congress' intent was to not alter the common-law tradition of fair use
adjudication.'40 In addition, the Court warned that in order to foster cre-
ativity, the four factors cannot be rigidly applied."' The Court rein-
forced this warning by reiterating its assertion from Harper & Row,'42
calling for a case-by-case fair use analysis."
The Court proceeded to apply the four factors of the fair use doctrine,
emphasizing the commercial aspect of the first factor. In applying the fair
use test, the Court found that, although the case needed to be remanded
for further fact findings, a commercial parody may be a fair use within
the meaning of § 107.'" This was the first time that the Court reached a
decision on whether parody may be a fair use.'4
The first factor, the one discussed most extensively by the Court was
"the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."'" The
Court divided the first factor into two parts, first analyzing the extent to
which the work is a parody and then questioning the commerciality of
the work.'47 The preamble to § 107, which indicates that the use should
be for "criticism or comment,"'" aided the Court in its inquiry into the
parodic purpose and character of 2 Live Crew's song. Within this inquiry,
the Court analyzed the extent to which the work was "trans-
Id. at 1169 (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
4,436)). From this, it can be ascertained that overprotection of a copyrighted work
would chill creativity and therefore stifle the public's exposure to new ideas and infor-
mation because every work of art is necessarily based on a previous work See supra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text
139. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1170; see also supra note 6.
140. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1170 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 66 (1976)).
141. Id. at 1170 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
142. 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
143. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1170. The Court further explained that the four fair use
factors are not to "be treated in isolation"; rather "[a]ll are to be explored and the
results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright." Id. at 1170-71 (quot-
ing William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presump-
tions, and Parody, 11 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. UJ. 667, 685-87 (1993)).
144. Id. at 1164.
145. Id. at 1171. Indeed, the Court considered this issue once before in Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), but failed to issue an opin-
ion at that time. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
146. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. 1171 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988)).
147. Id. at 1171-74.
148. Id.
[Vol. 23: 205, 1995] As Unoriginal as They Wanna Be
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
formative."49 A work is transformative if it alters the nature of or adds
something novel to the original, thereby creating a wholly new expres-
sion."'" The Court reasoned that parody, like other comment and criti-
cism, can be transformative because the parodist can add variations to or
present a different take on the original. In doing so, the author can claim
fair use under § 107. The Court relied on previous decisions, all holding
that parody may be fair use, to reach this conclusion. 5 '
Applying the modem definitions of "parody,"'52 the Court indicated
that the parodic version must still comment on, or criticize, the original.
Only in so doing may the parody incorporate elements of the prior
work."5 However, if the work uses the elements merely out of laziness
or for shock value, rather than for comment or criticism, a fair use de-
fense is severely weakened."5 Consequently, the other element of the
first factor, commerciality, weighs more heavily in the fair use determina-
tion."
The Court then applied the first factor to determine if 2 Live Crew's
track did in fact comment on Orbison's song. The Court framed the
threshold inquiry in assessing a fair use defense of a parody as being
"whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.""M The
Court was not willing to evaluate the effectiveness of the parody.'57
149. Id.
150. Id. The Court sought this "transformative" character because this metamorpho-
sis keeps the work from infringing upon the original, thus maintaining the goal of the
Copyright Clause. Id. However, the Court noted that transformation, or lack thereof,
is not determinative on the issue of fair use, but if present, weighs strongly in favor
of fair use. Id.
151. Id. at 1171; see, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the parody "When Sunny Sniffs Glue" of the song "When Sunny Gets Blue" is a fair
use); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the parody "I Love Sodom" of the
song "I Love New York" is a fair use).
152. See supra note 7.
153. Campbell, 114 S. Ct at 1172.
154. Id
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1173.
157. Id. The Court stated that this inquiry is irrelevant to a fair use evaluation. Id.
After all, "'[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of" a work. Id. (quoting Justice
Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)); see al-
so Yankee Publishing, Inc. v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 280
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak
clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed.").
However, the Court determined that 2 Live Crew's version could reason-
ably be perceived as commenting on the original:
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true,
with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal
responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the naivete of the
original of an earlier day, as a rejection of the sentiment that ignores the ugliness
of the street life and the debasement that it signifies. It is this joinder of reference
and ridicule that marks off the author's choice of parody from the other types of
comment and criticism that traditionally have had a claim to fair use protection as
transformative works."
The Court's analysis subsequently turned to the second component of
the first factor, the commercial nature of the use. This was the Court's
primary emphasis in this case. The Court ruled that the court of appeals
erred in assigning undue weight and essentially confining its treatment to
the fact that 2 Live Crew's song was made for a commercial purpose.'"
This misapplication was based on the erroneous proclamation in
Sony'6 that "'every commercial use of copyrighted material is presump-
tively... unfair.'"'6' According to the Court, the commercial or non-
profit educational nature of a work is only one element in assessing the
fair use factors."n Consequently, the Court reasoned that a commercial
use alone does not bar a finding of fair use any more than a nonprofit
educational use requires a finding of fair use." 3
The Court reiterated its assertion that Sony does not stand for the
proposition that commerciality creates a presumption against a fair
use." The Court did not give any justification for its anomalous state-
ment in Sony; it merely cited many examples from Sony indicating an
express rejection of any per se rule. For instance, in Sony, the Court
called for a "sensitive balancing" of all pertinent facts, noted that Con-
gress had rejected any "bright-line" rules, and stated that the
commerciality, or lack thereof, is "not conclusive" and should be bal-
158. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1173.
159. Id. at 1174.
160. 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
161. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174.
162. Id. The Court based this contention on the language of the Copyright Act and
previous Supreme Court cases. For example, the Court interpreted the main clause of
§ 107 as mandating a broader investigation into purpose and character. Moreover, in
Harper & Row, the Court indicated that the congressional intent behind § 107 was to
maintain a complete and total analysis of all of the relevant facts rather than to
adopt per se rules. Id. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 561 (1985)). The Court then explained the consequence of a presumption of
unfair use for commercial works: the statute would be obliterated since nearly all of
the illustrative uses listed in § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism,
teaching, scholarship, and research, are carried on for profit. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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anced with the other factors."s The Court ultimately concluded that
Sony requires consideration of all of the factors and nothing less, and
that the commerciality of a work merely tips the scale in the direction of
unfair use."
The Court then proceeded to the second factor, the nature of the copy-
righted work. 7 In considering this factor, the Court acknowledged that
some works fall more neatly under the scope of the Copyright Clause
and therefore are more stringently protected." The Court agreed with
both the district court and court of appeals in finding that Orbison's "Oh,
Pretty Woman" was one such work." Nonetheless, the Court dismissed
the second factor as indeterminative in any parody case, "since parodies
almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.""
The Court found the third factor more dispositive on the issue of fair
use. The third factor applies when attempting to determine whether "'the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole'.., are reasonable in relation to the purpose of
the copying.""'v This factor is thus connected to the first factor because
165. Id.
166. Id. The Court was aware that, when considering whether use is commercial or
not, it may be difficult to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial use.
The Court provided a vivid example: The creation of a parody for the sole purpose
of promoting a product weighs more heavily against fair use "than the sale of a par-
ody for its own sake, let alone one performed a single time by students in school."
Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1175. The Court had difficulty explaining why some works are more
deserving of protection than others, although the Court did provide examples of
where a distinction between "core" and "copied" work exists. Id. It appears from
these examples that works requiring a great deal of creative and intellectual input are
less likely to be subject to a fair use defense than mere factual compilations. See id.
169. Id. Once again, the Court gave no rationale for this conclusion, but it can be
easily seen that writing and recording a song would clearly be a more creative en-
deavor than merely collecting facts and recording them in a book. Nevertheless, this
analysis is suspect if the Court is implying that, by virtue of its creativity, a song is
more closely aligned with the goals of the Copyright Clause than is a factual compi-
lation. After all, a song cannot be considered more useful than an encyclopedia full
of knowledge. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
170. CampbeU, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
171. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988)); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (stating that extensive quoting may be fair use
in a review of a published work or a news account of a speech, but not in a news
story on an unpublished book); see also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984) (finding that home videotaping of television programs,
the degree to which a particular copying is valid hinges on the purpose
and character of the use.'72 Moreover, this factor is linked to the fourth
factor because the same facts will expose the extent "to which the par-
ody may serve as a market substitute for the original."' The Court il-
lustrated the relationship among the factors in the following manner. If a
party copies verbatim a "substantial portion" of the original, the copied
work is less likely to be transformative.74 Since the copy does not sig-
nificantly alter the original, it is likely to fulfill the market demand for
the original.'
The Court agreed with the court of appeals' evaluation that the third
factor requires consideration of both the quantity and quality of the ma-
terials used.'76 The Court illustrated the relationship between quantity
and quality with a discussion of its Harper & Row decision.'" In Harp-
er & Row, even though only 300 words from President Ford's memoirs
were copied, the Court found unfair use.'78 The Court reasoned that the
particular quotes "amount[ed] to the 'heart of the book,'" the part that
will most likely sell the book." However, the Court disagreed with the
lower court's application of these guidelines."s
Before explaining its decision, the Court offered a general characteriza-
tion of parody. The Court forewarned that "[p]arody presents a difficult
case" since its effectiveness necessarily depends upon an audience recog-
nizing the original within the new work."' Including the "original's most
distinctive features" is an important aid in recognizing the original within
the copy." It is reasonable for a parodist to use as much of the original
as is necessary to "conjure up" the original." However, assessing rea-
sonable use is not an easy process."
although it involves the reproduction of an entire work is not necessarily indicative
of unfair use).
172. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1175-76.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1175; see Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d 432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1986).
177. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175; see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985).
178. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-66.
179. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175-76 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-66).




184. Id. The Court reasoned that, once recognition is achieved, how much more can
be taken without constituting an infringement depends upon the extent to which the
artist intended to parody the original and the probability that the parody will replace
the original in the marketplace. Id.
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Unlike the court of appeals, the Supreme Court found that the amount
of the original taken by 2 Live Crew was not unreasonable as a matter of
law under the third factor of the fair use doctrine, even though 2 Live
Crew's version may have purloined the heart of the original.'" In mak-
ing this determination, the Court scrutinized "Pretty Woman," evaluating
its content, lyrics, and music.'" The Court indicated that 2 Live Crew
did in fact copy both the distinctive opening bass riff and the first line of
the original. 7 However, the Court determined that this was reasonable
use, considering the parodic purpose of the song." The Court felt that
these initial characteristics were the heart of the original and were nec-
essary for "conjuring up" the original.'" The Court concluded that using
a less distinctive portion of the original would not have achieved the
work's parodic purpose."
The Court's inquiry then focused on the parodist's changes beyond the
use of the song's opening.'9' Central to the Court's analysis were rea-
sonableness in light of the parody's purpose and ability to replace the
original in the market." The Court thought it highly determinative that
2 Live Crew, after copying the original bass riff and lyrics, "departed
markedly from the Orbison lyrics for its own ends" and "produced other-
wise distinctive sounds, interposing 'scraper' noise, overlaying the music
with solos in different keys, and altering the drum beat."'" Accordingly,
the Court found the parodistic effect of the work outweighed the insig-
nificant amount of copying.'" Therefore, the third factor, as a matter of
law, did not support a claim of copyright infringement against 2 Live
Crew."
In concluding its analysis of the third factor, the Court ruled that as
far as the lyrics were concerned, 2 Live Crew took no more of the origi-
nal than was necessary to conjure up the original." As such, the Court
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1172-73, 1176.
187. Id. at 1176.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.; see Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1986).
191. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1176.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (M.D.




"fail[ed] to see how" 2 Live Crew's "copying [could] be excessive in rela-
tion to its parodic purpose, even if the portion taken is the original's
'heart.'"'" The Court expressed no opinion on whether the copying of
the bass riff was excessive, but instead remanded the case to determine
this issue "in light of the song's parodic purpose" and "the potential for
market substitution. " "
Finally, the Court arrived at the fourth factor, "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."" This
factor requires a court to determine not only the market harm caused by
the particular work, but also the harm to the potential market for the
original that would be caused by an increase in similar harmful conduct
by other people.2" Harm to either the original market or the derivative
market may satisfy this factor."0 '
In dispensing with the effect caused by 2 Live Crew's song on the
market for the original, the Court once again found error in the court of
appeals' analysis.0 2 The court of appeals presumed that a commercial
use is harmful to the original, thus construing the factor against 2 Live
Crew without a showing by Acuff-Rose of any particular harm." The
Court finally had to distinguish the facts of Sony and further explain its
reasoning, in order to retreat from any per se rules or presumptions
when a commercial use is involved.2"
The Court explicitly reserved the issue of a presumption of market
harm for commercial use-an idea supported by Sony-for a case involv-
ing mere verbatim duplication of the original. In that instance, the work
clearly is not transformative, but a mere copy of the original.2" That
kind of copy thus eliminates the need for the original in the marketplace
and therefore causes harm.2" On the contrary, where the work is
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1176-77.
199. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
200. 3 NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.05[A][4] (1994).
201. As stated previously, under § 106, one of the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner is the right to prepare derivative works based on the owner's original work.
Therefore, the fourth factor requires a consideration of harm to both the original and
any derivative works. See Berline v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 822 (1964).
202. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-79.
203. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). The court of appeals continued to base its reasoning on Sony,
holding that because "the use of the copyrighted work is wholly commercial . . . we
presume a likelihood of future harm to Acuff-Rose exists." Id.
204. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-78.
205. Id. at 1177.
206. Id. The Court reiterated the need for a "sensitive balancing of interests" in all
other instances. Id. at 1177 n.21 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
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transformative, containing distinguishable or additional elements, it will
not necessarily serve as an exact market substitute for the original in
every instance."7 Furthermore, when the transformative work is clearly
a parody, the requisite market harm will be less recognizable, or even
non-existent, because the parody and the original usually play different
roles in the market.2"
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that parodies inevitably cause
harm to the originals on which they are based, but they cause a different
type of harm.2" Using the example of a theater review, the Court
analogized that, because of its inherent critical purpose, a parody, like a
negative review, may inhibit demand for the original."' However, the
Court noted that mere criticism does not amount to copyright infringe-
ment;' instead, the parody must wholly displace the market demand
for the original by being so similar in context that consumers either like
the parody just as well as the original or actually prefer it over the origi-
nal."2 The Court remanded the issue of market harm to the original for
more evidence concerning the relevant markets.2"2 The Court found
that, since fair use is an affirmative defense, 2 Live Crew bears the bur-
den of proving that their song did not act as a market substitute for the
original.
214
Next, the Court considered the logical corollary: the potential market
harm of 2 Live Crew's song on derivative works, including other paro-
dies, created or licensed to be created by Acuff-Rose."' The Court
quickly dismantled any contention that 2 Live Crew's song could cause
harm to a derivative parody made by Acuff-Rose."' The Court based its
reasoning on the oft-stated rule that "there is no protectable derivative
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984)). The Court stated that "[miarket harm is a matter
of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not only with the amount of
harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other factors." Id.
Sony involved noncommercial copying of television programs, and the Court contrast-
ed this with commercial use. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
207. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-78.
208. Bisceglia, supra note 8, at 23.
209. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-78.
210. Id. at 1178.
211. Id. (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)).
212. Id.; see also Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438.
213. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177, 1179.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1178.
216. Id.
market for criticism.""7 In explaining this rule, the Court stated that
even though the copyright owner has the exclusive right to prepare, and
license rights to others to prepare, derivative works based on the origi-
nal, the owner will almost never develop or license the right to develop
derivative works that are criticisms of his original."8 Therefore, logically
flowing from this is the rule that the only potential derivative uses are
those that the original creator would create or license to create him-
self."9 These uses would not include critical works of the original.' °
The Court concluded that the lower court erred in considering the mar-
ket harm on potential parodic derivative works created by Acuff-
Rose.22 '
After dispensing with the issue of parodic derivative uses, the Court
considered the potential market harm of 2 Live Crew's song on other
types of derivative works that are not critical of the original.'n The
Court found that a parody may be more than merely critical of the origi-
nal; it may encompass other elements that go beyond criticism to be-
come a protectable derivative work." In application, the Court asserted
that 2 Live Crew's song represents not only a parody, but rap music as
well. Accordingly, the Court considered the market harm of 2 Live
Crew's song on potential rap derivatives of "Oh, Pretty Woman" created
by Acuff-Rose.'
The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to decide the
likely effect of 2 Live Crew's parodic rap song on the derivative market
for a non-parody, rap version of "Oh, Pretty Woman." The Court re-
sisted Acuff-Rose's contention that 2 Live Crew's recording a rap version
of "Oh, Pretty Woman" and another rap group requesting a license to
record a rap derivative necessitated a finding that a rap market existed
for "Oh, Pretty Woman." 6 The Court stated that it needed more evi-
dence to find that a potential rap market was harmed by 2 Live Crew's







222. Id. at 1178-79.
223. Id. at 1178. In such an instance, the law ignores the critical elements and only
considers the other elements of the work. Id.
224. Id. at 1178-79. Again, the Court was looking for a market substitution effect on
rap derivatives of "Oh, Pretty Woman" caused by 2 Live Crew's rap song, rather than
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In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that it was error for the court
of appeals to rule that "the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody of
'Oh, Pretty Woman' rendered it presumptively unfair."' The Court stat-
ed that, in ascertaining whether a transformative use such as a parody is
fair, there is no presumption of "either the first factor, the character and
purpose of the use, or the fourth factor, market harm," when the nature
of the work is wholly commercial." Moreover, the Court found that the
court of appeals erred in holding that 2 Live Crew incorporated too
much of Orbison's original, given the underlying parodic purpose of 2
Live Crew's version.' ° The Court therefore reversed the decision of the
court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion."
B. Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with the Court that
the case should be remanded, but offered some additional insight and
clarification concerning fair use in the context of parody.' Justice Ken-
nedy began by agreeing that there is now a fair use defense for paro-
dies.' More specifically, he listed several rules regarding parody and its
limits.' Most of these rules only rehashed the Court's assertions, but
some further clarified them. One of these rules is that a commercial
parody may be a fair use.' Another is that parody must "target the
original" and comment on or criticize the original.' Since the subject




232. Id. at 1180-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 1180 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
234. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
235. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a discussion on the Court's application of
this rule, see supra notes 144-230 and accompanying text.
236. CampbeU, 114 S. Ct. at 1180 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated,
"It is not enough that the parody use the original in a humorous fashion ... .The
parody must target the original, and not just its general style, the genre of art to
which it belongs, or society as a whole." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that the copied work must be at
least in part "an object of the parody"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992); FIsher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) ("(A] humorous or satiric work deserves pro-
tection under the fair-use doctrine only if the copied work is at least partly the tar-
get of the work in question.").
of a parody must be the original version, this necessitates some use of
the elements of the original in order to "conjure up" the original in the
minds of the viewer or listener. 7 Lastly, Justice Kennedy stated a rule
similar to the Court's holding that the copyright owner's right to prepare
or license derivative works does not include critical works, such as paro-
dies.'
After defining the general limits of parody and the fair use doctrine,
Justice Kennedy continued to restate the Court's assertions, including its
take on the four factors of the fair use test. However, Justice Kennedy
attempted to clarify the factors, using them as reinforcement for keeping
the definition of parody within its proper limits.' The first factor, the
purpose and character of use, implicates the definition of parody.' The
second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, is almost irrelevant to
a fair use inquiry "since 'parodies almost invariably copy publicly known,
expressive works.'"24" ' Justice Kennedy then insisted that the third fac-
tor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
whole, is also contained within his "target the original" definition of paro-
dy.2
42
The Justice proceeded to weave his definition of parody throughout
his in-depth analysis of the fourth factor of the fair use doctrine, the
effect of the use on the market for the original and derivative works.'
Justice Kennedy seemed slightly concerned with the Court's consider-
ation of this factor, but still reinforced much of the Court's analysis.'
He did, however, expressly consider the difficulty in determining whether
harm to the market results from a parody's criticism or its substitution of
the original. 5
237. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1180 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also MCA, Inc. v.
Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that if the original is not the target
of the parody, "there is no need to conjure it up").
238. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1180 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 1180-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 1180 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
241. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). This, again, is merely a restatement of what the
majority opinion stated. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
242. Campbell, 114 S. Ct at 1181 (Kennedy, J., concurring). To expound upon this
proposition, Justice Kennedy stated that, in order to "target the original" and to re-
ceive the desired parodic effect, the amount of copying needed to "conjure up" the
original depends upon the object of the parody. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Some
works that are less popular than others require substantial copying to make the
original recognizable in the parody, while other works with a very distinctive element
require that only the particular element be copied. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
243. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. See supra notes 199-227 and accompanying text for the Court's statements con-
cerning this factor.
245. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1181 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy hammered home the idea that the
definitional limits of parody are the "guiding light," and if followed within
the appropriate bounds, the inquiry into the fourth factor would be sim-
ple."6 What Justice Kennedy implied was that by definition a parody is
an original and independent creative work with its own distinctive char-
acteristics. Thus, independent "[c]reative works can compete with other
creative works for the same market, even if their appeal is overlap-
ping. "
7
Despite Justice Kennedy's seemingly inadequate knowledge of copy-
right law with respect to derivative works, his analysis is still constitu-
tionally indispensable. Although constitutional analysis was not expressly
part of the Court's discussion, -it was implied in the Court's fair use anal-
ysis. Justice Kennedy's discussion focuses on the protection of a copy-
right owner's exclusive constitutional right to exploit a work:
We should not make it easy for musicians to exploit existing works and then later
claim that their rendition was a valuable commentary on the original. Almost any
revamped modem version of a familiar composition can be construed as a "com-
ment on the naivete of the original,". because it will be amusing to hear how
the old tune sounds in the new genre. Just the thought of a rap version of
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony or "Achy, Breaky Heart" is bound to make people
smile. If we allow any weak transformation to qualify as parody, however, we
weaken the protection of copyright. And underprotection of copyright disserves
246. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
247. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's point is not entirely clear, but
his discussion appears to skirt the issues when discussing parodies. As stated previ-
ously, a parody, because it incorporates many of the elements of the original, would
properly be classified as a derivative rather than original work, notwithstanding the
fair use exception to infringement Justice Kennedy defines the parody as a "new
creative work," which can "compete with other creative works," including the original,
for the same market, "even if their appeal is overlapping." Id. at 1181 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). By implementing the words "new creative work," Justice Kennedy thus
categorizes the parody as an original rather than derivative work. See id. Of course,
if 2 Live Crew's song were wholly independent and "new[ly] creat[ed]," we would not
be discussing the fair use defense and the work could freely compete with the origi-
nal for the same market However, 2 live Crew's work is derivative, which is not
wholly independent and newly created, but is based upon and targets another work.
In a derivative work, the author must contribute "something more than a merely trivi-
al variation, something recognizably his own." See L Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder,
536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 857 (1976). However, the central characteristic of a parody is its use of
another work's elements, and under the fourth factor, it may not compete with the
original for the same market See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
the goals of copyright just as much as overprotection, by reducing the financial
incentive to create.'
Finally, Justice Kennedy expressed his discontent with the Court's
finding that 2 Live Crew's song could reasonably be perceived as com-
menting on or criticizing Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman."249 The Jus-
tice noted that he was "not so assured" that 2 Live Crew's song qualifies
as a parody under the first factor.2" Despite this uncertainty, he agreed
with the Court's treatment of the remaining three factors, at least to the
extent that its analysis provided sufficient guidance from which the Dis-
trict Court could determine that the song is not a fair use. 5'
V. IMPACT
The fair use doctrine has existed since 1841 when it was be-
stowed-some say fatally and surreptitiously-upon the judicial con-
sciousness by Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh.252 The doctrine, subse-
quently codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, has evolved continuously
since then, with the courts desperately trying to set forth the proper aux-
iliaries and factors from which to apply the balancing test.2"
Nevertheless, in the courts' neverending ethereal quest for the
alchemist's magical elixir by which to transmute this vile doctrine into a
golden and translucent application, they have strayed from and lost sight
of both the explicit rationales underlying the doctrine and the express
congressional mandate of the four factors. Although the issue remains
confusing, courts are not to be blamed for this chaos. After all, this enig-
matic doctrine has been called "the most troublesome in the whole law
of copyright." " Fortunately for courts, attorneys, law students, artists,
and society as a whole, the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose has
deciphered the fair use code. The Court's holding will have a substantial
impact in many areas.'
A. Judicial
The Campbell decision will impact the judicial system in two ways.
First, Campbell has provided definition, clarity, and justification to the
existing four-prong fair use doctrine without altering Congress' intent.
248. CampbeU, 114 S. Ct at 1181 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 1181-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 1181 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 1181-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
252. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
253. See supra notes 61-116 and accompanying text.
254. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
255. See iqfra notes 256-73 and accompanying text.
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Prior to Campbell, the task of formulating an efficient and clear applica-
tion was left to the lower courts, leaving them grasping for the !proper
standard to apply and resulting in widespread inconsistencies.' By
reaffirming the four factors and clarifying the manner in which they are
to be applied, the Court has set forth well-defined, consistent, and pre-
dictable standards the lower courts can easily apply. Favoring a new or
modified version would abrogate the most meaningful, definitive, and
workable standard available for adjudicating parody claims and would
again throw the lower courts' decisions into disarray.
Along with the affirmation and elucidation of the four-prong fair use
doctrine in Campbell the Court provided a well-defined and flexible stan-
dard for protecting the rights of both the artist and parodist. Because the
facts and circumstances of each case are markedly different, the Court
emphasized the folly of trying to formulate a set of restrictive rules for
various factual situations involving unfair use of copyrighted material.257
The Court retreated from Sony and shunned any per se rules or pre-
sumptions, instead calling for a balancing of all the facts and circum-
stances.' Ruling that a particular parody, such as one with a purely
commercial purpose, is per se unfair use would open a floodgate of cas-
es to create other per se protections.' The flexible, fact-sensitive ap-
proach envisioned by Congress would therefore be destroyed."u
There is little doubt that the creation of a per se approach to fair use
would have the consequence of muddying § 107's recently cleared wa-
ters. The legal questions it would spawn are legion. For example, if a
commercial purpose becomes a per se unfair use, then courts must de-
cide what constitutes a commercial purpose."' Moreover, if vulgarity or
256. See supra notes 61-116 and accompanying text.
257. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174-75 (1994).
258. Id.
259. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th CONG., 2d SEss. 66 (1976) (Congress had "no
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid
technological change .... [T]he courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to par-
ticular situations on a case-by-case basis.").
260. See id.
261. Many other problems arise with a commercial purpose presumption of unfair
use. First, many of the favored uses in § 107 contain profit-seeking elements. Deveny
A. Deck, Fine Tuning Fair Use Music Parody: A Proposal For Reform in Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 71 U. DET. MERCY L REV. 59, 68 (1993). For example, news
reporting is certainly an industry with profit motives. Moreover, many scholars earn a
living from publishing their research. See 2 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, LAW OF COPYRIGHT,
§ 15.04[C][1] (1991). Secondly, by focusing on the commercial nature of a parody,
other enumerated § 107 purposes such as criticism and comment are ignored. Deck,
immorality become unfair uses, courts must again determine their defini-
tions. The doctrinal complexities that would confront courts by accepting
one per se rule would be byzantine. It would unnecessarily embellish and
nullify the flexibility of the four-prong test of § 107.
B. Constitutional
Ascertaining the fairness of a parody of a copyrighted work raises two
concerns. At one end of the spectrum, the Constitution specifically pro-
motes the creation of art by granting authors the exclusive right to ex-
ploit their own work.2" At the opposite end, a court cannot favor this
right to the degree that other works even remotely related to the copy-
righted work, in form or content, constitute infringement. This would
clearly subvert an individual's right to free speech.2" With courts having
to consider both aforementioned concerns in applying a fair use stan-
dard, the current enunciation of the fair use analysis in Campbell pro-
vides the optimal standard for assessing the fairness of a parody. The
Campbell standard promotes equilibrium between the two constitutional
concerns.
The Campbell Court's enunciation of the first fair use prong, the pur-
pose and character of the use, is carefully constructed to reconcile these
two opposing concerns. It accomplishes this feat in two ways. First, uses
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, scholarship, and research
weigh more heavily in favor of fair use than does a purely commercial
use.2" Through this distinction, the fair use doctrine subordinates a
copyright holder's interest to public interest in the use of valuable infor-
mation." Second, the Campbell Court set forth the requirement of
transformation under the first factor the new work must do more than
merely repackage the original; it must build upon or alter the purpose
and character of the original work.2" In this manner, First Amendment
considerations override the copyright holder's interest only when the
parody provides new information, insights, and understanding, thereby
enriching the public's knowledge.267 Without these two mechanisms, an
supra, at 68. Lastly, a commercial use presumption invalidates the Copyright Clause
by discouraging the creation of socially useful art merely because the work produces
income. Id.
262. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
263. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a discussion of the relationship between the
Copyright Clause and First Amendment and the fair use doctrine's reconciliation of
these two concerns, see supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
264. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994).
265. Hartnett, supra note 46, at 199. "The first amendment governs not only the
right to speak and publish, but also the right to receive information. The copyright
clause is also directed to the furtherance of learning and education." Id.
266. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
267. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L REv. 1105,
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individual copyright owner would be protected to such an extent under
the copyright clause that such protection would completely impede the
public's access to new information and ideas. Thus, the first prong serves
the interest of these two conflicting but equally important considerations.
The construction of the second prong of the fair use doctrine, which
focuses on whether the nature of the work is factual or creative, has
negligible impact on the balancing of the First Amendment and Copyright
Clause since most parodies target creative, not factual, works.
268
The design of the third prong, the amount and substantiality of the
taking, also harmonizes the concern of an author's exclusive right in
their creation with the public's interest in free speech and exposure to
information and ideas. In other words, by taking too much of a copy-
righted work, a parodist has generated little, if any, original material and
thus has no speech to protect. However, if the parodist takes less than
this threshold amount, the remainder of the parody obviously comprises
new, independent and socially desirable thoughts, which are protected by
the First Amendment.
Finally, the Campbell Court's validation of the fourth factor, the effect
of the use on the market for the copyrighted work, has kept intact the
delicate balancing of interests underlying the factor. The rationale behind
this fourth factor is based on the premise that copyright laws exist to
stimulate artistic creativity for the benefit of the public. Unfair uses
would impair financial incentives of authors and, in turn, stifle creative
energy.2" However, the Campbell Court's requirement of market sub-
stitution27 aims, to some degree, to limit the protection of the artist so
as to account for the social benefit derived from parodies.27" ' Rather
than denying fair use when the copyright holder makes any showing of
negative market effect, market substitution analysis requires that the
harm be great enough to supplant the economic incentives of the original
author. Thus, the fourth factor protects parody's social function under
the First Amendment, while promoting the fundamental premise of the
1111 (1990).
268. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U. S. 822 (1964).
269. Id.
270. See supra note 199-201 and accompanying text.
271. The social benefit derived from a parody is accomplished through First Amend-
ment rights, the protection of which serves to promote the public's interest in the
free flow of ideas as well as the broadest dissemination of information. See infru
notes 275-81.
Copyright Clause. Authors are protected from excessive interference with
the financial rewards of their creative efforts.
C. Proposed Additional Factor
The fundamental premise of the Copyright Clause is that protection
will promote economic incentive to the author.2" Given this premise,
this Note suggests that an additional factor be added to the fair use cal-
culus: Whenever a fair use excuses a parody from copyright infringe-
ment, the parodist must pay a fee or royalty to the copyright owner.
Congress should determine the amount of this fee or royalty.2" Without
such a reward to the copyright holder, a parodist receives a "free ride"
from the copyright system. As a result, artists may have less incentive to
create, knowing that someone else can come along and freely use parts
of their work.274 Compensating an author supports the goals behind the
Copyright Clause and therefore provides equilibrium between it and the
First Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
"A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original."'
The doctrine of fair use has earned a reputation as "the most trouble-
some in the whole law of copyright."27 Compounding the "trouble," par-
ody has been labeled the most "troublesome fair use issue."2" These
sentiments are significantly bolstered by the widespread confusion
among the lower courts concerning the enigmatic fair use doctrine in the
context of parody.278 Fortunately, the Supreme Court in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. ended the confusion. By reaffirming the four
factors and clarifying the manner in which they are to be applied, the
Court set forth well-defined, consistent, and predictable standards lower
272. This Note recognizes that certain types of works are created without monetary
motivation. Nevertheless, the Framers of the Constitution "were political and social
realists with a broad knowledge of human nature and of the needs of society." JOHN
S. LAWRENCE & BERNARD TIMBERG, FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY: COPYRIGHT LAW AND
THE NEW MEDIA 330 (2d ed. 1989). The framers realized that except in a minority of
instances, "the profit system" was the most essential mechanism with which to "stim-
ulate" creative activity. Id.
273. This author is aware of only one other author who has proposed such a fee
arrangement See LAWRENCE & TIMBERG, supra note 271, at 319.
274. See id. at 320.
275. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 14 (1977).
276. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
277. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (Nelson, J., dissenting)
(6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct 1164 (1994).
278. See text accompanying supra notes 61-116.
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courts can easily and properly apply. In the process, the Court not only
validated parody as an art form, but implicated other important consider-
ations as well.
In the Court's most significant analysis, it strongly opposed articulating
an infinite set of bright-line rules for every unfair use of copyrighted
material. The Court specifically retreated from Sony's holding that a
commercial use is presumptively unfair. Instead, the Court called for a
case-by-case evaluation in light of all the particular facts and circum-
stances, with no one factor being issue-determinative.'
Throughout its evaluation, the Court balanced two conflicting elements
of the Constitution: the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. In so
doing, the Court properly acknowledged that the benefits conferred upon
society by the parody's humor, commentary, and criticism of the original
work outweigh the copyright holder's monopoly right.
Thomas Kuhn once wrote:
[W]hen paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. Led by a new para-
digm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more impor-
tant, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with
familiar instruments in places they have looked before .... Literally as well as
metaphorically, the man accustomed to inverting lenses has undergone a revolu-
tionary transformation of vision.m
Just as in science, inversions of art-the conversion of and building upon
past works-lead to "revolutionary transformation[s] of vision." In turn,
new visions spark new ideas, beliefs, and creations. The recycling and
transformation of old ideas in order to create new and genuine expres-
sions is vital to the fluid intellectual, educational, and emotional expan-
sion of our society. The Court in Campbell recognized parody as such a
transformation. To ignore this recognition and to inhibit such creative
279. See supra notes 143, 164-66 and accompanying text.
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thought, comment and criticism would painfully suffocate the flourishing
of knowledge and culture, and ultimately, the advancement of society."l
GREGORY D. DEUTSCH
281. This notion has been advanced by Judge Kozinski:
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Cre-
ativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely noth-
ing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technolo-
gy, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those
who came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed
to nurture.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinsld, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
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APPENDIX A
"Oh, Pretty Woman" by Roy Orbison
and William Dees
Pretty Woman, walking down the street,
Pretty Woman, the kind I like to meet,
Pretty Woman, I don't believe you, you're
not the truth,
No one could look as good as you
Mercy
Pretty Woman, won't you pardon me,
Pretty Woman, I couldn't help but see,
Pretty Woman, that you look lovely as can
be
Are you lonely just like me?
Pretty Woman, stop a while,
Pretty Woman, talk a while,
Pretty Woman give your smile to me
Pretty woman, yeah, yeah, yeah
Pretty Woman, look my way,
Pretty Woman, say you'll stay with me
'Cause I need you, I'll treat you right
Come to me baby, Be mine tonight
Pretty Woman, don't walk on by,
Pretty Woman, don't make me cry,
Pretty Woman, don't walk away,
Hey, O.K
If that's the way it must be, O.K
I guess I'll go on home, it's late
There'll be tomorrow night, but wait!
Is she walking back to me?
Yeah, she's walking back to me!
Oh, Pretty Woman.
APPENDIX B
"Pretty Woman" as Recorded
by 2 Live Crew
Pretty woman walkin' down the street
Pretty woman girl you look so sweet
Pretty woman you bring me down to that
knee
Pretty woman you make me wanna beg
please
Oh, pretty woman
Big hairy woman you need to shave that
stuff
Big hairy woman you know I bet it's tough
Big hairy woman all that hair it ain't legit
'Cause you look like 'Cousin It'
Big hairy woman
Bald headed woman girl your hair won't
grow
Bald headed woman you got a teeny weeny
afro
Bald headed woman you know your hair
could look nice
Bald headed woman first you got to roll it
with rice
Bald headed woman here, let me get this
hunk of biz for ya
Ya know what I's saying you look better
than rice a roni
Oh bald headed woman
Big hairy woman come on in
And don't forget your bald headed friend
Hey pretty woman let the boys
Jump in
Two timin' woman girl you know you ain't
right
Two timin' woman you's out with my boy
last night
Two timin' woman that takes a load off my
mind
Two timin' woman now I know the baby
ain't mine
Oh, two timin' woman
Oh pretty woman
